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COMMENTS
JOINDER OF OFFENSES: LOUISIANA'S NEW APPROACH IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Criminal prosecutions are initiated by formal accusation-an indictment, information, or affidavit.' The purposes of the accusation are to
inform the accused of the charge or charges against him;2 to inform the
trial judge of the nature of the prosecution so that he may rule properly on
the admissibility of evidence offered at trial; 3 and to serve as a basis for
determining the extent to which jeopardy has attached. 4
Because the likelihood of conviction increases with the number of
offenses cumulated in one trial, 5 the rules regulating joinder of offenses
within an accusation are among the most crucial in the administration of
criminal justice. 6 The determination of whether to sanction joinder of
offenses within a single accusation involves the often competing interests
of judicial efficiency and fairness to the accused. 7 The former usually is
I. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 15; LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 382-85. See generally
Slovenko, The Accusation in Louisiana Criminal Law, 32 TUL. L. REV. 70 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as SLOVENKO].
2. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 464. When used in the Code of Criminal Procedure
the term "'indictment" generally includes affidavits and bills of information. LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 461. The indictment supplies only the "essential facts"
constituting the offense charged. A bill of particulars supplies the details of the
alleged offense. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 484-85. See also U.S. CONST. amend.
V; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 15.
3. Identification of the crime charged establishes those elements that must be
proved in order to convict the accused. Facts establishing those elements are
properly provable as material issues. LA. R.S. 15:435 (1950). See generally
Comment, Determining Relevancy: Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 36
LA. L. REV. 70 (1975).
4. See generally LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 591-98.
5. 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CRIMINAL RULES,
8.02[11] at 8-3
[hereinafter cited as MOORE].
6. In Louisiana, LX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493, as amended by La. Acts 1975,
No. 528, § 2, presently governs joinder of offenses within an accusation. LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. .706 limits consolidation of separate indictments for trial to those
charging offenses which could properly have been joined in a single indictment.
Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) and 13.
7. Liberal joinder of offenses reduces demands on prosecutorial and judicial
resources through elimination of duplicative prosecutions. ABA STANDARDS,
Joinder and Severance, Introduction at 258 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA
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9
said to be served by liberal joinder rules,8 the latter by restrictive ones.
Joinder rules should effect a delicate balance between conservation of
judicial resources and risk of undue prejudice to the accused.
In 1975, the Louisiana legislature modified the rules applicable to
joinder of offenses in accusations,' ° but few cases interpreting the
amended provisions have reached the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, experience -under prior Louisiana joinder schemes may
provide insight into how the new rules will be applied.

History of Joinder of Offenses in Louisiana
Before 1928
Before the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928,
Louisiana courts followed the prevailing common law rule that two or
more separate offenses" arising out of the same criminal act or a single
continuous unlawful transaction could be joined in separate counts of a
8.05 [2] at 8-18-19. But the
8.02 [1] at 8-3, and
STANDARDS]; 8 MOORE
convenience and savings of time resulting from liberal joinder rules occur only
when the offenses joined are related, as where they arise out of a single illegal act or
occur as part of a single unlawful scheme or plan. 8 MOORE 8.05 [2] at 8-19. When
the crimes charged are merely similar or of the same character "the only time saved
by . . .joinder is the selection of one jury rather than two. Except for character
witnesses, the evidence will usually be entirely separate." Id.
8. An accused may be prejudiced by liberal cumulation of charges because the
jury assumes that, because he is charged with several offenses, he must be guilty of
something. The jury may misuse evidence of one offense to convict the accused of
a separate offense tried at the same time. Further, the defendant may be
confounded in the presentation of inconsistent defenses to the separate crimes.
ABA STANDARDS at 255; 8 MOORE 8.05 [2] at 8-19; SLOVENKO at 71.
9. "On occasion, however, the situation may be somewhat the reverse: the
prosecution may be interested in maintaining the opportunity to proceed with
multiple trials, while the defendant prefers a prompt and unified disposition of all
charges2ABA STANDARDS at 285; 8 MOORE 8.05 [2] at 8-19 n.16, 8.02 [1] at 8-3
n.2; see also, Bennett, Revision of Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure-A
Survey of Some of the Problems, 18 LA. L. REV. 383, 397-99 (1958).
10. La. Acts 1975, No. 528, §§ 1, 2.
11. An indictment joining in separate counts charges of separate offenses
should be distinguished from one charging a single offense in several different ways.
The latter procedure was sanctioned in Louisiana in order to provide for situations
in which there was some variance between the state's proof and its allegations.
State v. Jacques, 45 La. Ann. 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893); State v. Clement, 42 La. Ann.
583 (1890); State v. Cook, 20 La. Ann. 145 (1868); State v. Johnson, 10 La. Ann. 456
(1855). In the event a single offense was charged, but in several ways in separate
counts of an accusation, the defendant could only be convicted of one crime. State
v. John, 129 La. 208, 55 So. 766 (1911). See SLOVENKO at 70 n.134.

COMMENTS
single accusation. 2 Joinder was permissive in these circumstances; the
prosecutor could charge and try the offenses separately.' 3 When a single
act gave rise to multiple offenses, as when an accused unlawfully
discharged a shotgun wounding two persons, the allegations could be
joined in a single count charging one offense,' 4 or in separate counts in
5
accordance with the general rule.'
When felony offenses did not arise out of the same criminal act or
unlawful transaction, they could not be joined properly in a single
indictment or information.' 6 To join them constituted misjoinder, and
subjected the accusation to challenge, though the challenge had to be
raised timely or the defect was waived.' 7
Two decisions in the early twentieth century had the effect of
restricting joinder of separate offenses arising out of the same criminal act
or a continuous unlawful transaction. In State v. Nejin'8 the court
formulated the requirement that offenses, to be joinable, must be subject
12. State v. Thorton, 142 La. 797, 77 So. 634 (1918); State v. Green, 37 La.
Ann. 382 (1885); State v. Cook, 42 La. Ann. 85, 7 So. 64 (1890); State v. Laqu6, 37
La. Ann. 853 (1885); State v. Gilkie, 35 La. Ann. 53 (1883). See also SLOVENKO at
76-78; Comment, Joinder of Criminal Offenses in Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 127
(1941). If the court characterized the indictment as charging but one offense, only
one sentence could be imposed. See note 14, infra.
13.

SLOVENKO at 76-77.

14. This amounted to an exception to the generally applicable common law rule
against duplicity, which is charging separate and distinct offenses in the same
count. E.g., State v. Johns, 32 La. Ann. 812 (1880). The court held that the
prosecution could not charge separate offenses in a single count; an indictment
bearing this defect would be quashed. In Johns the state had joined in a single count
an allegation that the defendant stabbed with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill
with the separate allegation that he inflicted a wound less than mayhem. The court
rationalized this exception to the general ban against duplicity by noting that when
the same act causes the violations, the offenses are not truly "separate" and
"distinct" within the meaning of the duplicity ban. State v. Batson, 108 La. 479, 32
So. 478 (1902); SLOVENKO at 77. If at trial the evidence showed that the crimes were
not the result of the same act, then the defendant could compel the district attorney
to elect which crime would be prosecuted. Cf. La. Code Crim. P. art. 226 (1928).
See State v. Morrison, 184 La. 39, 165 So. 323 (1935). Compare State v. Green, 37
La. Ann. 382 (1885) with State v. Scott, 48 La. Ann. 293, 19 So. 141 (1896). Upon a
guilty verdict, when the indictment or information charged commission of one
offense in several ways in separate counts, only one sentence could be imposed. Id.;
SLOVENKO at 70.

15.
16.
17.
18.

See, e.g., State v. Gilkie, 35 La. Ann. 53 (1883).
E.g., State v. John, 129 La. 208, 55 So. 766 (1911) (in dicta).
Id. See also State v. Fritz, 27 La. Ann. 360 (1875).
139 La. 912, 72 So. 452 (1916).
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to the same mode of appeal; 9 in State v. Hataway 20 it stated the additional
2
rule that joinable offenses must be triable by the same type of jury. 1
Joinder of Offenses under the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure

The legislature included in Louisiana's first Code of Criminal
Procedure a provision directing joinder in separate counts of the
accusation of all offenses arising out of a single criminal act or unlawful
transaction. 22 Article 218 provided:

When two or more crimes result from a single act, or from one
continuous unlawful transaction, only one indictment will lie; but
each of said distinct crimes, though some of them be felonies and
others of them misdemeanors, may be separately charged in distinct

counts in the same indictment.
Article 217 prohibited joinder of separate offenses within a single
accusation except when the Code specifically authorized joinder 23 -as in
Article 218. The effect of these provisions was to forbid joinder of most
unrelated offenses within a single accusation, while mandating it when the
crimes were related because they arose out of the same criminal act or
19. In Nejin the defendant was charged separately with violations of a state
statute and a municipal ordinance. A conviction resulting from the state charge was
appealable to the supreme court, while appeal on conviction of the municipal charge
would have been to the district court, although both offenses properly could be
tried in the first instance in city court (139 La. at 913, 72 So. at 452). The defendant
was tried and convicted on both charges in city court, but the supreme court
reversed and held that offenses could not be joined in a single accusation and trial
when the crimes charged were subject to different modes of appeal (139 La. at 915,
72 So. at 453).
20. 153 La. 751, 96 So. 556 (1923).
21. The defendant in Hataway had been charged with burglary and larceny in
separate counts of a single bill of information; he was tried and convicted of petty
larceny by a twelve-man jury. Larceny was then properly tried by a five-man jury,
while burglary was triable .by a twelve-man jury (La. Const. art. 7, § 41 (1921);
compare LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17). The court, invalidating the conviction for
improper joinder of offenses within an accusation, noted that a defendant accused
of larceny had an absolute right to have that offense tried by a five-man jury.
Joinder of the non-cognate offenses in separate counts of a single information
denied the defendant his constitutional rights.
22. See generally SLOVENKo at 78-81; Joinder of Criminal Offenses, supra note
12, at 127.
23. La. Code Crim. P. art. 217 (1928) provided: "Except as otherwise
provided under this title, no indictment shall charge more than one crime, but the
same crime may be charged in different ways in several counts." Besides article
218, other exceptions to the non-joinder rule of Article 217 included Articles 225,
246, and 249. Article 225 was carried forward into the 1966 Code of Criminal
Procedure as Article 481; articles 246 and 249 were carried forward as article 482.
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transaction. Whether the drafters of the 1928 Code intended to codify
existing rules or to change them is less than clear;24 the prior rule
sanctioning joinder of cognate offenses had been permissive,25 while the
rule embraced in Article 218 was mandatory.
In any event, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied Article 218
literally in State v. Roberts,26 holding that when two or more offenses
were directed to be joined in "only one indictment," that is, when they
arose out of the same act or transaction, they had to be joined, and when
the state failed to do so, it could not press the omitted charges in
subsequent prosecutions. 27 The supreme court observed that the preclusion
of prosecution was based not on the concept of fQrmer jeopardy, but rather
on the mandatory language of Article 218.28
Because State v. Roberts did not involve offenses triable by different
types of juries or subject to varied methods of appeal, the questions of
constitutionality of joinder of offenses which had been discussed in State
29
v. Hataway and State v. Nejin were neither raised nor addressed.
However, in State v. Jacques30 the court considered the constitutionality
of Article 218.31 In Jacques the offenses charged in the single indictment
24. La. Code Crim. P., Preface at iii (Dart ed. 1932); Note, 6TUL. L. REV. 140,
141-42 (1931).
25. See text beginning at note 11, supra.
26. 170 La. 727, 129 So. 144 (1930).
27. Id. at 732-36, 129 So. at 145-47. See also State v. Hurst, 173 La. 459, 137 So.
852 (1931) (writ of habeas corpus properly issued to release defendant confined on
charge which under article 218 should have been combined with previous
prosecution).
28. 170 La. at 730-32, 129 So. at 145. See generally La. Code Crim. P. art. 279
(1928); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 596.

29. See text beginning at note 18, supra.
30. 171 La. 994, 132 So. 657 (1931). SeeState v. O'Banion, 171 La. 323, 131 So.
34 (1930); State v. Hill, 171 La. 277, 130 So. 865 (1930). The constitutional invalidity
of article 218 was implicit in both cases, yet the court declined expressly to
repudiate article 218-even on a limited basis. These cases involved offenses triable
by five-man juries being joined with offenses triable by twelve-man juries. The
holding of State v. Hataway, 135 La. 75 1, % So. 556 (1923), also involved joinder of
offenses triable by twelve and five-man juries. That case left open the possibility
that offenses triable by twelve-man juries could be joined whether capital offenses
were charged, in which the verdict had to be unanimous, or whether other absolute
felonies were charged, requiring the concurrence of only nine jurors for a verdict.
31. See also State v. Cormier, 171 La. 1035, 132 So. 779 (1931). In Cormier
defendants were charged jointly in two indictments, the first charging attempted
murder, the second charging manslaughter. Both charges stemmed from a
continuous transaction. Defendants were convicted on the first charge and moved
to quash the second when the second trial began on the ground that article 218
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were murder and robbery. Both offenses were triable by twelve-man
juries, but the former required a unanimous verdict, while the latter
required only that nine jurors concur in the verdict. The supreme court
agreed with the defendant's contention that joinder of these offenses in an
indictment and trial, in accordance with the language of Article 218,
violated his constitutional rights under Article 7, § 41 of the 1921
Louisiana Constitution. 32 The court said that Article 218 was wholly
unconstitutional and could not be used even to require joinder when the
3
offenses were triable by the same type of tribunal .
The court in State v. White, 34 a case in which the accused was
charged with two murders allegedly arising out of the same unlawful
transaction, retreated from the position taken in Jacques, noting that the
pronouncement in that case that Article 218 was totally void was
unnecessarily sweeping, and that there was no constitutional reason to
strike down Article 218 insofar as the joinder mandated by that article was
limited to joinder of offenses triable by the same type of tribunal.35 One
writer has suggested that Article 218, as interpreted by the court in State v.
White "was a substantial codification of the old Hataway case rule. "36
Had the legislature not taken further action, the post- White rule with
respect to joinder would have been that separate offenses had to be joined
in separate counts of a single indictment or information whenever the
offenses arose out of the same criminal act or from a continuous unlawful
transaction, provided, the offenses to be joined were triable by the same
required joinder. The court noted that the language of article 218 was contrary to the
provisions of the 1928 Louisiana Constitution, art. 7, § 41. Citing State v. Jacques,
the court declared that article 218 was unconstitutional in toto. Thus the state's
non-joinder of offenses arising out of the same transaction was perfectly permissible; indeed, it was constitutionally necessary. The second indictment charged a
distinct and separate offense, so there was no question of double jeopardy.
32. 171 La. at 999, 132 So. at 658.
33. "[A]rticle 218 . . . must be construed as a whole, .... as the legislature
clearly intended that its provisions should operate in their entirety, or not at all."
Id. The court continued,

"[o]ur conclusion is . . . that Article 218 . . . is

unconstitutional, null, and void." Id. at 1000, 132 So. at 658. The court's reasoning
is of doubtful validity. See Note, 6 TUL. L. REV. 140, 141 (1931).
34. 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931). See Joinder of Criminal Offenses, supra
note 12; Note, 6. TUL. L. REv. 140 (1931).
35. 172 La. at 1049-51, 136 So. at 47-49.
36. Joinder of Criminal Offenses, supra note 12, at 130. One important
distinction should be observed. Insofar as article 218 was still constitutionally
applicable under the holding in White, joinder of separate offenses arising from the
same act or unlawful transaction was mandatory. State v. Roberts, 170 La. 727, 129
So. 144 (1930). The pre-1928 rule merely permitted joinder of cognate offenses. See
text beginning at note 11, supra.
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type of tribunal. The requirement of Nejin that the joined offenses be

subject to the same method of appeal might arguably have been applicable
37
as well because Nejin too was predicated on constitutional consideration.

Joinder of Offenses after 1932 until 1966
The legislature responded to the Jacques and White cases by repealing
Article 218.38 However, the legislature left Article 217 intact, 39 making

joinder of separate offenses within a single accusation generally impermissible absent an express statutory exception. The court in its early decisions
following the repeal of Article 218 disregarded the remaining provisions of
Article 21740 and instead suggested that the repeal of the former provision
left the previously prevailing common law rule in effect, 4' reviving the rules

of Hataway and Nefin that related offenses could be joined when they were
subject to the same mode of appeal and triable by the same type of tribunal.
A parallel line of cases soon emerged reflecting a superior view of the
effect of the repeal of Article 218 .42 In State v. Cannon43 the defendant
was indicted separately for killing two persons in the same unlawful
transaction. He was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to death on one
charge. The district attorney then moved to dismiss the second charge, and
the defendant, who was urging an insanity defense, opposed the dismissal.

The Louisiana Supreme Court directed dismissal," and in discussing the
propriety of the separate indictments observed,
37. The court treated the defect in State v. Nejin, 139 La. 912, 72 So. 452 (1916), as
jurisdictional, and state court jurisdiction is constitutionally delimited. SeeLa. Const. art.
7, §§ 10, 35 (1921); LA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 5, 16
38. La. Acts 1932, No. 153.
39. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 217 (1928) at note 23, supra.
40. SLOVENKO at 79-81; Joinder of Criminal Offenses, supra note 12, at 131-32.
41. State v. Turner, 178 La. 925, 939, 152 So. 567, 571 (1934); State v. Mansfield, 178
La. 393, 151 So. 631 (1933). In State v. Morrison, 184 La. 39, 165 So. 323 (1936), the court
approved defendants' convictions upon an indictment charging in a single count the
murder of two individuals. (The indictment was duplicitous, but the court relied on the
exception to duplicity enunciated in State v. Batson, 108 La. 479, 32 So. 478 (1902). See
note 14, supra.) Without discussing the effect of the repeal of article 218, the court stated,
"There was nothing essentially or fundamentally wrong in [the defendants'] being
subjected to only one trial for the murder of two persons." Though not representing the
sounder view, some more recent authority exists applying the Turner dicta. See State v.
McDonald, 224 La. 555, 70 So. 2d 123 (1954). See generally SLOVENKO at 80; Joinder of
Criminal Offenses, supra note 12, at 131-32; But see note 42, infra.
42. E.g., State v. Giangrosso, 263 La. 275, 268 So. 2d 224 (1972); State v. Carter, 206
La. 181, 19 So. 2d 41 (1944); State v. Cannon, 185 La. 395, 169 So. 446 (1936).
43. 185 La. 395, 169 So. 446 (1936).
44. The court observed that the defendant "can . . .have no other interest in forcing
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since the repeal of article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by
Act No. 153 of 1932, it was necessary that two separate indictments
be returned if the state intended to prosecute this defendant for each

homicide.

45

The court apparently chose to apply the general rule expressed in Article

217 that separate offenses must be charged in separate indictments absent
an express statutory exception authorizing joinder.' This view prevailed
47
in the subsequent jurisprudence.
Adoption of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure did not affect the
general rule that a single offense could be charged in a single indictment or
information listing in separate counts alternative ways in which the offense
could have been committed, 48 although the court could not under such an
accusation impose separate cumulative penalties for each count. 49

Under the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure misjoinder of offenses in
an indictment or information was not a fatal defect; it was deemed waived
if the defendant failed to object timely.50 Arguing by analogy to Article

22 1, the objection to misjoinder of offenses was to be raised by demurrer
or motion to quash, but under Article 252 the court lacked authority to
dismiss a defective indictment,5 2 and could only sever the indictment.5 3
the issue of his mental status in the untried case than to relieve him of the penalty in the
case already tried and disposed of." Id. at 401-02, 169 So. at 448.
45. Id. at 400, 169 So. at 447-48 (emphasis added).
46. See La. Code Crim. P. arts. 225, 246, and 249 (1928).
47. State v. Giangrosso, 263 La. 275, 268 So. 2d 224 (1972); State v. Carter, 206 La.
181, 19 So. 2d 41 (1944).
48. E.g., State v. Nahoum, 172 La. 83, 133 So. 370 (1931); SLOVENKO at 70.
49. This result was mandated by the double jeopardy provision. See, e.g., United
States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 919 (2d Cir. 1957).
50. SLOVENKO at 71. The defect of duplicity-charging two or more offenses in the
same count of an indictment or information-was likewise waivable. La. Code Crim. P.
art. 221 (1928). See also State v. Richard, 245 La. 465, 158 So. 2d 828 (1963); State v.
Blankenship, 231 La. 993, 93 So. 2d 533 (1957). But see State v. Norris, 242 La. 1070, 141
So. 2d 368 (1962).
51. La. Code Crim. P. art. 221 (1928).
52. La. Code Crim. P. art. 252 (1928) provided inter alia: "No indictment shall be
quashed . . . for any one or more of the following defects: . . .That there is a misjoinder
of the offenses charged in the indictment, or duplicity therein. . . . If the court be of the
opinion that [either of these defects] exist in any indictment, it may sever such indictment
into separate indictments, or into separate counts as shall be proper.
Cf. State v.
Jones, 176 La. 723, 146 So. 682 (1933).
53. When the joined offenses were distinct and arose out of different transactions,
Article 226 authorized a motion to compel the district attorney to elect which offense he
would prosecute. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 226 (1928). This article was not carried
forward into the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure.

COMMENTS
Joinder of Offenses under the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure
Several commentators expressed dissatisfaction with the general rule
articulated in Article 217 that offenses, even when they arose out of the
same criminal act or a continuing unlawful transaction, could not be joined

in a single indictment; most called for adoption of a rule of permissive
joinder similar to the common law rule in effect prior to the 1928
codification. 54 As ultimately adopted, however, the 1966 Code of
Criminal Procedure embodied substantially the same rules regarding

joinder of offenses which had prevailed under the 1928 Code after the
repeal of Article 218 in 1932. Article 493,55 the principal article governing
joinder of offenses within an accusation, generally prohibited joinder,
subject to express statutory exceptions. 5 6 As it then read, Article 493
57
authorized charging the commission of a single offense in several ways,
with separate theories of how the crime was committed being articulated in

separate counts of one accusation. Charging a single offense in this
58
manner was not objectionable because it amounted to neither misjoinder
59
nor duplicity.

54. SLOVENKO at 80-81; Bennett, Revision of Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure-A Survey of Some of the Problems, 18 LA. L. REV. 383, 397-99 (1958); Bennett,
Blind Spots in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, I LA. B.J. 62, 66 (April 1954);
Joinder of Criminal Offenses, supra note 12, at 132.
55. Article 493 (1966) was virtually identical to article 217 of the 1928 Code of
Criminal Procedure (see note 23, supra). See the Comments accompanying La. Code
Crim. P. art. 493 (1966).
56. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 481 (permitting joinder of separate acts of theft in
separate counts of a single indictment, with the grade of the offense predicated on the
aggregate amount) and 482 (permitting cumulation in separate counts of charges of
receiving stolen goods and theft). Article 482 authorizes joinder of manslaughter and
abortion charges, but is constitutionally suspect. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Compare La. Code Crim. P. arts. 225, 246, and 249
(1928).
57. La. Code Crim. P. art. 493 (1966) provided interalia: "[T]he same offense may be
charged in different ways in several counts." Since technically the indictment charges but
one offense, imposing separate cumulative penalties for each count is improper. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has sustained convictions stemming from prosecutions initiated
under indictments drafted in conformity with this provision. State v. Bluain, 315 So. 2d
749 (La. 1975); State v. Johnson, 278 So. 2d 84 (La. 1973); State v. Todd, 278 So. 2d 36 (La.
1973); State v. Hungerford, 278 So. 2d 33 (La. 1973); State v. Didier, 259 La. 967, 254 So.
2d 262 (1971).
58. Misjoinder of offenses under the 1966 Code scheme occurred when two or more
separate offenses were joined in a single accusation. The proviso of article 493 sanctioned
charging "the same offense" in several ways. La. Code Crim. P. art. 493 (1966).
59. Duplicity, under the original scheme of the 1966 Code, was "inclusion of two
offenses [or more] in the same count." See La. Code Crim. P. art. 491 (1966), repealed by
La. Acts. 1975, No. 528, § 1.
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Despite the general prohibition in Article 493, misjoinder of offenses
within an accusation was not automatically a fatal defect, and was deemed
waived if a timely and proper objection was not made. 60 Apparently, a
major reason for requiring timely objection to misjoinder was to allow the
prosecutor to amend the defective accusation. 6 1 If the defendant timely
objected to the misjoinder of offenses, to prosecute him under the
defective accusation was reversible error.62 When an indictment actually
charged a single offense, and the trial court erroneously treated it as
charging several offenses and sentenced the convicted defendant accordingly, the supreme court corrected the trial court's error notwithstanding
63
the defendant's failure to object to "misjoinder."The 1975 Amendments to the Joinder of Offenses Provisions
In 1975, by Act No. 528, the Louisiana legislature amended the Code of
Criminal Procedure articles relative to joinder of offenses in an indictment or
information.' 4 The legislation effects a radical departure from the previous
general rule that joinder of offenses within an indictment was impermissible.
Amended Article 493 provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether
felonies or misdemeanors, are of the same or similar character or are based
on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan;
60, Before its amendment by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2, La. Code Crim. P. art. 495
provided: "The objections of duplicity, . . .or misjoinder of offenses may be urged only
by a motion to quash the indictment." See La. Code Crim. P. arts. 532(3) (providing that a
motion to quash may be based on allegations of duplicity and misjoinder-in which case
the remedy is severance of the counts or indictment) and 535(C) (providing that a motion to
quash based on duplicity or misjoinder may be filed of right within ten days after
arraignment or before commencement of trial, whichever is earlier, and it may be filed
with the court's permission more than ten days after arraignment but before trial).
Compare the procedure utilized in the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure for objection to
misjoinder of offenses discussed in the text beginning at note 50, supra. See City of Baton
Rouge v. Norman, 290 So. 2d 865 (La. 1974).
61. E.g., State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 229 So. 2d 329 (1969).
62. State v. Giangrosso, 263 La. 275, 268 So. 2d 224 (1972).
63. See the cases cited in note 57, supra. If multiple offenses had been charged, the
defendants' failure to object would have waived the defect. City of Baton Rouge v.
Norman, 290 So. 2d 865 (La. 1974).
64. The legislation, proposed by the Louisiana District Attorneys' Association, also
included changes in the rules relating to joinder of defendants. No "legislative history"
exists respecting these changes; there are no comments, as there likely would have been
had the Louisiana State Law Institute proposed the changes.

1976]

COMMENTS

provided that the offenses joined must be triable by the same mode of
trial .6
Article 493 now provides for permissive joinder of offenses 66 in a manner not
67
unrelated to that of Article 218 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure,
except that it expands the instances in which joinder is allowed. In addition to
permitting joinder when offenses arise out of the same criminal act or a
continuing unlawful transaction, Article 493 now allows joinder when the
offenses are "of the same or similar character." The concluding proviso of
Article 493 appears to be an accommodation to the earlier decisions of State v.
Hataway, State v. Nejin, and State v. Jacques.6"
Because the legislature phrased the amendment to Article 493 as a list of
instances in which joinder of offenses is permitted, the Code of Criminal
Procedure no longer contains an express general ban against joinder.69 Obviously the legislature, because it did not repeal Article 495, but only amended it
to delete the reference to duplicity°-joinder of separate offenses within a
single count of an indictment-contemplated that joinder of offenses within an
accusation should not be permitted except under the terms of the Code.
Therefore, misjoinder should still be a valid objection. Further, the 19757
legislation repealed Articles 491 and 492-the articles relating to duplicity. '
The reason for this change is unclear, since the defect of charging multiple
offenses in a single count, which is a distinctly different defect from misjoinder
of offenses, 72 is just as likely to arise after the liberalizing of the joinder rules as
it was under the prior scheme.
65. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 528. Compare FED.
R. CRIM. P. 8(a) (text at note 78, infra); ABA STANDARDS at § 1.1; THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE-MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (tent. draft No. 5, 1956).

66. By making joinder permissive rather than mandatory, as article 218 of the 1928
Code had been, the legislature avoided the problem presented in State v. Roberts, 170 La.
727, 129 So. 144 (1930) (discussed in text beginning at note 26, supra).
67. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 218 (1928) in text at note 22, supra.
68. See discussion in text beginning at note 18, supra.
69. La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2. The legislature could have followed the general
pattern set in the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure-enacting the new rule as a separate
article authorizing joinder in the listed circumstances, and retaining the general rule that
"except as otherwise provided," no indictment shall charge multiple offenses. The
approach taken by the legislature leaves open the possibility, albeit the argument is
extremely tenuous, that there is no longer a defect of misjoinder, since no article expressly
forbids joinder of offenses not covered by the amended article 493 or articles 481 and 482.
70. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2 provides:
"The objections of misjoinder of defendants or misjoinder of offenses may be urged only
by a motion to quash the indictment." LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 532 and 535 were not
altered by the legislature. Thus, though urged via a motion to quash, the remedy for
misjoinder remains severance of the indictment. See discussion at note 60, supra.
71. La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 1.
72. "The charging of more than one distinct crime in the count of an indictment is
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Despite the deletion of Articles 491 and 492, the concept of duplicity as a
defect in pleading, albeit a non-fatal one, arguably is retained in the new joinder
scheme, because Article 493 as amended requires that cumulated offenses be
charged in "separate count[s]. '' 3 Assuming the continued availability of a
"duplicity" objection when the state charges a defendant with the commission
of two separate crimes in one count of an accusation, the defendant will have to
object to "misjoinder" of offenses under Article 495.7' The inevitable result
will be unwarranted confusion between duplicity and misjoinder.
While increasing the availability of permissible joinder of offenses the
legislature added an article allowing the defendant or the district attorney, upon
a showing of undue prejudice to the accused or to the state, to compel severance
of otherwise properly joined offenses. Article 495.1 was added to provide:
The court, on application of the prosecuting attorney, or on application of
the defendant shall grant a severance of offenses whenever: (a) if before
trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense; or (b) if during the trial
upon consent of the defendant, it is deemed necessary to achieve a fair
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. The
court shall consider whether, in view of the number of offenses charged
and the complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will be
able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each
offense."
Article 495.1 is not addressed to misjoinder; it contemplates situations in which
joinder is technically permissible under Article 493, but in which the prejudice
resulting from joinder is such that either party's right to a fair trial is
jeopardized. Either the defendant or the state can require that the court sever the
duplicity, or double pleading. The term 'duplicity' is also frequently applied to the joinder
in one indictment of several counts for different offenses. However, it is considered
wrong to speak of the joinder of distinct offenses in separate counts of an indictment as
duplicity. The term duplicity should be limited to the joinder of two or more separate
offenses in the same count of an indictment." SLOVENKO at 70.
73. The legislature failed to amend LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 532, which provides that
duplicitive indictments properly objected to by a motion to quash may not be "quashed,"
but that severance of the count is proper. See discussion at note 60, supra.
74. The situation could arise in at least two ways. First, the offenses might be
properly joinable under the criteria set forth in LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493, but they may
have been joined in the same count rather than in separate counts. Second, the offenses
may be dissimilar and wholly unrelated so that joinder is not permitted by article 493. In
the latter case, if the improperly joined offenses were cumulated in the same count, the
indictments would be doubly defective, being not only defective for misjoinder but for
duplicity as well. Presumably the accused would, in either situation, be required to urge
the defect as "misjoinder" under an article 495 motion to quash. However, in the former
situation the defect is clearly not misjoinder.
75. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1 added by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2.
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cumulated offenses. A motion to sever need not be made before trial; in fact,
the article is specifically to the contrary. Finally, Article 495.1 articulates
functional criteria by which the court is to measure the likelihood of prejudice.
The net effect of the 1975 legislative amendments is to accord the state a
broadened opportunity to join offenses in an accusation and trial and ideally to
protect the defendant from undue prejudice by requiring that offenses joined
be logically related and by allowing the accused, as well as the state, to
move for severance. In this way the legislature has attempted to accommodate the competing interests of judicial and prosecutorial efficiency and
76
fairness to the accused.
Sources of the New JoinderRules
Whether the legislature has succeeded in striking the desired balance
between efficiency and fairness will depend ultimately on how the courts
construe and apply the new rules. Important to questions of interpretation and
construction are considerations of the sources from which the amendments
were derived.
Sources of Article 493
Amended Article 49377 tracks the language of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 8(a),78 differing in only two respects. First, the language of Federal
Rule 8(a) which sanctions cumulation of "felonies or misdemeanors or both,"
and which clearly suggests that felonies may be cumulated with misdemeanors
in a single accusation, was altered by the Louisiana legislature by the deletion
of the words "or both." Thus it is possible to construe the Louisiana statute as
allowing only the cumulation of felonies with felonies and misdemeanors with
misdemeanors, and as barring the cumulation of felonies with misdemeanors.
Second, the Louisiana legislature added a proviso to Article 493 specifying that
the permissibility of joinder is contingent upon the joined offenses being
subject to "the same mode of trial, 7 9 perhaps to avoid the state constitutional
80
problems implicit in joinder of offenses triable by different kinds of juries.
76. See discussion in text beginning at note 5, supra.
77. See text of LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2,
in text at note 65, supra.
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) provides: "Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or
are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." Seegenerally8 MOORE 8.01
et seq.
79. See text beginning at note 30, supra.
80. See State v. Jacques, 171 La. 994, 132 So. 657 (1931) (discussed in text
beginning at note 30, supra); State v. Hataway, 153 La. 751, 96 So. 556 (1923)

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

While federal juries almost always are comprised of twelve members, 8' so that
the joinder of misdemeanors and felonies does not create constitutional
problems of jury sufficiency, in Louisiana an unqualified right to join felonies
and misdemeanors or absolute and relative felonies unquestionably would
create the problems earlier presented under Louisiana's "common law"
joinder scheme and under its experiment with mandatory joinder. 82 The
legislature's modification of the federal rule appears to have been addressed to
this problem.
Joinder under the amended Article 493 is permissive, as under the federal
scheme, with discretion vesting solely in the prosecutor. The defendant has no
right to require joinder, even when the state possesses sufficient evidence to
bring the charges together in a single trial, and even though the defendant may
desire joint trial of the offenses. 83 Further, the criteria under which Article 493
permits joinder coincide with those listed in the federal scheme. Because the
legislature utilized the federal rule regulating joinder of offenses, federal
jurisprudence interpreting that provision becomes relevant to Louisiana courts
construing Article 493.
Source of Article 495.1
Although the Louisiana legislature adopted the basic rule of joinder of
offenses expressed in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), it did not adopt
the companion provision relative to relief from prejudicial joinder embodied in
Federal Rule 14.84 Instead, upon recommendation of the Louisiana District
Attorneys' Association, the legislature adopted a rule paralleling the American
Bar Association recommendations on severance of offenses.85 Although it lists
(discussed in note 21, supra); State v. Nejin, 139 La. 912, 72 So. 452 (1916) (discussed
in note 19, supra).
81. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23. Even where cases are triable by jury, the right may
be waived. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); 8 MOORE 23.03 at 23-5. "An
effective waiver . . . requires (1)
that the waiver be in writing, (2) that it be approved
by the court, and (3) that the consent of the government be obtained." Id. at 23-27.
See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). Since a defendant can waive
altogether his right to jury trial, he can agree to a reduction in the usual number of
jurors. 8 MOORE 23.04 at 23-10.
82. See cases cited at note 80, supra.
83. Compare LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 528,
§ 2, with ABA STANDARDS at §§ I.1& 1.3. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).
84.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides interalia: "If it appears that a defendant or the

government is prejudiced by joinder of offenses. . . in an indictment or information
or by such joinder for trial together, the courts may order an election or separate trials
of counts, .

.

. or provide whatever other relief justice requires ....

85. Compare LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1 added by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2
(see text at note 75, supra) with ABA STANDARDS at § 2.2(b): "The court, on
application of the prosecuting attorney, or on application of the defendant . . .
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the same criteria as the ABA source provision for the trial judge to consider in
determining whether to sever, the new Article 495.1 is mandatory rather than
permissive, and the Louisiana judge must grant a severance if the criteria are
86

met.

The legislature's reason for enacting a severance provision differing from
the federal scheme after having followed the federal rules respecting initial
joinder is unclear, but may be due in part to the desirability of having functional
guidelines for determining when to sever, such as those included in the ABA
provision.87 The ABA scheme also makes a basic, perhaps desirable distinction
between severance before trial and severance duringtrial. 88 When severance is
urged before trial on the ground that joinder is unduly prejudicial to the
defendant because of the multiplicity of offenses or for other reasons, the court
should order severance when it is appropriate;during trial, a severance will be
granted only when it is necessary.89 A broader test applies before trial because
the trial judge must base his decision on speculation about how the trial will
develop, while a stricter test reasonably applies during trial since the parties and
the court are in a better position to assess the actual prejudice to the defendant
which may result from continuation of the joint trial.' ° Of course, if the judge
should grant a severance of offenses whenever: (i) if before trial, it is deemed
appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of
each offense; or (ii) if during trial upon consent of the defendant, it is deemed
necessary to achieve a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of
each offense. The court should consider whether, in view of the number of offenses
charged and the complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will be able
to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense."
86. Article 493 uses "shall" rather than "should." See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art.
495.1 in text at note 75, supra; see text of ABA STANDARDS at § 2.2(b) in note 85,
supra.
87. It was the express intent of the drafters of the ABA Standards that functional
criteria be given to provide "a solid foundation for judicial decisions" and to "aid in
the responsible exercise of . . . discretion and in . . .effective review" of joinder
and severance problems. Lack of functional guidelines was viewed as a major
weakness in many existing joinder-severance schemes. ABA STANDARDS at 286;
Erickson, The Standards of Criminal Justice In a Nutshell, 32 LA. L. REv. 369, 386
[hereinafter cited as Erickson].
88. ABA STANDARDS at § 2.2(b) (see note 85, supra).Generally, severance under
the federal scheme is available only when the defendant moves for it prior to trial.

Otherwise he may be held to have waived his objection. E.g., Pummill v. United
States, 297 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1961); 8 MOORE 14.02 [2] at 14-5. However, despite the
general rule, if circumstances develop at trial which make severance necessary, the
courts may permit it. Schafaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960). One court has
said that even after trial a defendant can raise the severance issue if the prejudice was
not readily apparent before trial. United States v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 494, 500 n. 12
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
89.

ABA

STANDARDS

90. Erickson at 387.

at § 2.2(b) (see note 85, supra).
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grants a severance after trial has commenced, the entire proceeding must be
aborted, and separate trials must be initiated. 9
Because Article 495.1 specifically authorizes the defendant to move for
severance after trial has begun, the rights granted under this article need not be
urged by a motion to quash under Article 495.92 Article 495 governs the mode
of objecting to misjoinder only, that is, joinder of offenses within an accusation
which is not sanctioned by Article 493. 91
Problems of Construction of the New Joinder Rules
Criteriafor Joinder
Article 493 now declares that offenses may be joined in separate counts of
a single accusation when they fall into one of four categories: when they arise
from the same act, stem from a single unlawful transaction, result from two or
more unlawful transactions connected by a common scheme or plan, or are of
the same or similar character. 94 Historically, at least, the first two joinder
criteria listed should be familiar to Louisiana courts, since they reflect not only
the prior common law rule permitting joinder of offenses in Louisiana,95 but
also the criteria applicable under the mandatory joinder rule in Article 218 of
the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure. 96 In both cases joinder is permitted
because the factual context out of which the offenses arose is the same, and
prosecution of the offenses separately would require the state to duplicate much
of the same evidence. 9" The same considerations apply when the offenses
joined result from two or more unlawful transactions, so long as they are
connected by a common scheme or plan. 98 With respect to offenses falling
within any of the first three categories listed, even if the rules of pleading
required separate accusation and trial, the trier of fact would almost certainly
learn of the uncharged offenses" either because they comprise part of the res
91. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1 requires that the defendant consent to
severance ordered after trial has begun; his consent being necessary to keep the
subsequent prosecutions from attack on double jeopardy grounds. Compare LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 591.
92. See discussion in text beginning at note 70, supra;see note 70, supra, for the
text of LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2.
93. Id. SeeLA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493, as amended byLa. Acts 1975, No. 528, §2
in text at note 6, supra.
94. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2.
Compare FED. R.

CRIM.

P. 8(a).

95. See discussion in text beginning at note II, supra.
96. See discussion in text beginning at note 22, supra.
97. 8 MOORE 8.05 [21 at 8-18-19, 14.03 at 14-7-8.2.

98. Id.
99. "[F]ailure to join all possible charges in the same. . . indictment does not
deprive the prosecution of their use for all purposes. Evidence of 'prior similar acts'
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gestae °°or because they are relevant to issues of knowledge, intent, system,' 0 '
or identity' 02 as to the offense charged.
However, with respect to offenses merely "similar" or of the "same
character," the factual connexity justifying even permissive joinder may be
lacking. 103 The degree of prejudice to the accused is likely to be increased,
since unrelated though similar offenses will be independently admissible
less often to prove knowledge, intent, system, or identity. " In addition, the

juxtaposition of multiple and unrelated counts may unduly prejudice the
defendant 0 5 by generating jury confusion over such issues as burden of
proof. '06
PrejudicialJoinder

The test for determining when joinder is so prejudicial that severance is
required under Article 495.1107 is whether the defendant's guilt or innomay be admissible in the trial of the prosecuted offense to show intent, knowledge, or
other matters." 8 MOORE 8.05 [1] at 8-18.
100. LA. R.S. 15:447-48 (1950); Comment, Excited Utterancesand Present Sense
Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661
(1969).
101. LA. R. S.15:445-46 (1950); Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in LouisianaTo Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., in the Case in Chief, 33 LA. L. REV. 614.
See the discussion of the probable effects of the new joinder rules upon State v.
Prieur,277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), beginning at note 155, infra.
102. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975); State v. Jordan, 276 So.
2d 277 (La. 1973).
103. 8 MOORE 8.05 [2] at 8-19.
104. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781
(La. 1973), held inadmissible for purposes of proving "intent" prior acts of rape
alleged to have been committed by the defendant. At a minimum the offense charged
and the offenses held inadmissible were "of the same or similar character," and
under the new joinder rules would properly be joinable in a separate indictment. If so
joined, defendant would be forced to rely on article 495.1 for a severance based on
the prejudice inherent in such joinder. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1. As a general
proposition however, "similar offenses" may be admissible to establish knowledge,
intent, system, and identity, and in such case there is no more prejudice accruing to
the defendant from joining the similar crimes, than would result from joinder of more
closely related offenses. Cf. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
105. "The vice of joinder of [merely] similar offenses is especially clear where
defendant has a good defense on one charge (and perhaps is innocent) but no defense
on the other. A severance will be granted if it can be demonstrated that joinder of
ofenses deprives defendant 'of a choice whether or not to take the stand.' "8 MOORE
14.03 at 14-11 (discussing federal rules of joinder and severance).
106. 8 MOORE 8.05 [2] at 8-19.
107.

8 MOORE

14.03 at 14-7; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 143 at 316-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
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cence as to each offense chargedmay be fairly determined in a single trial.
Implicitly, when the prejudice inherent in joinder of factually unrelated
offenses, crimes merely of similar or the same character, inhibits fair
determination of the accused's guilt or innocence, severance would be
proper. Article 495.1 contains functional criteria which a court must apply
in measuring the prejudice likely to result from joinder of offenses,
including the number and complexity of the crimes charged and the
likelihood of jury confusion.'
These criteria should not be treated as
exclusive, because other considerations may bear on the ultimate question,
e.g., whether the joint trial will prejudice the accused's right to a fair
determination of guilt or innocence.
If Article 495. 1 is interpreted to provide broad protection to an accused
by making severance of offenses readily available when he claims that
joinder is prejudicial, it should not matter that the prosecutor is given broad
rights to join offenses initially. The difficulty lies in the probability that the
determination of whether to sever offenses will be made by the trial court in
its discretion, and that the court's findings will be, as a practical matter,
extremely difficult to review. 1 Federal practice in this respect is similar. " 0
If offenses are joinable under Rule 8,"' but their joinder results in undue
prejudice to the accused"12 or to the state, the court in its discretion may
grant a severance of the offenses. Perhaps the soundest approach, in the
light of the steps already taken by the legislature, would be to adopt the
proposal of the American Bar Association" 3 and give the defendant an
absolute right to require severance of offenses whenever they are joined
solely because they are of the same or similar character.
Apparently no requirement exists under the new Louisiana scheme that
prejudicial joinder be raised as an objection before trial, since the article
108. See text of LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1 added byLa. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2
in the text at note 75, supra.
109. See the discussion on the scope of appellate review in text beginning at note
121, infra.
110. See WRIGHT at §§ 221 & 227.
111. See text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) at note 78, supra.

112. Joinder of offenses, though permissible under Rule 8(a), may result in
prejudice to an accused in a number of recognized ways: the accused may desire to
take the stand and testify as to one of the charges, but not as to the others. See Cross
v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Evidence of one of the offenses might
not be independently admissible in a trial for the other. See Drew v. United States,
331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The risk of jury misuse of evidence might be so great
that severance should be granted. See Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). See generally, WRIGHT § 143 at 316-17 & 222.
113. ABA STANDARDs at § 2.2(a).
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specifically allows the question to be raised during trial. Offenses can be

joinable under the terms of Article 493 and their joinder immune from
objections of "misjoinder" under Article 49514 but nevertheless, the effect
of the joinder may be so inherently prejudicial, when the guidelines of
Article 495. 1 are applied, that severance is necessary. "I The federal courts
are divided over whether the accused must object to the prejudicial joinder,

or whether the court can order severance sua sponte. 6 Most federal appeals
courts treat the defendant's failure to object to the prejudicial joinder of
7 though a minority
offenses properly joinable under Rule 8(a) as a waiver, "1
8
are willing to consider the question of prejudice first raised on appeal., 1
According to federal practice,"I9 however, if the offenses are not properly
joinable under the terms of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), then
the court has no discretion; it must order severance. And since the trial court

has no discretion, the standard of review is not "manifest error" or "abuse
of discretion," but is whether the court committed error. Failure to grant a
severance when the offenses are not properly joinable under Rule 8 is

reversible error. 120
Under the new Louisiana joinder-severance scheme, when offenses
are not properly joinable under Article 493,121 their joinder may be opposed
by a timely filed motion to quash. 122 The pre-amendment cases held that
failure to object to misjoinder amounted to waiver of the objection. 123 If,
114.

See text beginning at note 69, supra..
115. Many federal courts, ruling on motions to sever indictments for prejudicial
joinder, attach weight to whether the "similar" offense charged would be independently admissible to establish knowledge, intent, system, and the like. E.g., United
States v. Adams, 481 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Rodgers, 475 F.2d
821 (7th Cir. 1973); Bradley v. United States, 433 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Drew v.
United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
116. See WRIGHT § 221 at 432-33. Cases holding that an accused has waived his
right to object to prejudicial joinder, when the offenses meet the Rule 8 criteria,
represent the majority view. E.g., United States v. Flick, 516 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Franklin, 452 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1971); Mee v. United States, 316
F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964); Pummill v. United States,
297 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1961); Young v. United States, 288 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But
see United States v. Guterma, 181 F. Supp. 195 (D.C. N.Y. 1960).
117. See cases cited in note 116, supra.
118. E.g., United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967); Gajewski v.
United States, 321 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 968 (1964).
119. See WRIGHT at §§ 221 and 227.
120. E.g., McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76(1896); Ingram v. United States,
272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959).
121. See discussion in text at note 69,' supra.
122. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 528, § 2.
123. E.g., City of Baton Rouge v. Norman, 290 So. 2d 865 (La. 1974).
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however, no motion to quash is filed when improperly joined offenses are
charged in an indictment, has the defendant also waived his right to assert
prejudicial joinder under 495.1? Despite the retention of Article 495 as
amended, it would seem anomalous to allow a defendant's failure to object
before trial to misjoined offenses, offenses so unrelated that they cannot
even be described as "similar," to waive also his right to object to the
unduly prejudicial effects of that misjoinder, while at the same time
allowing a defendant to object even during trial to properlyjoined offenses
which unduly prejudice his right to a fair determination of guilt or innocence
as to each crime charged.
Scope of Review
According to federal practice, determination that offenses are joined
properly under Rule 8(a) is a question of law, reviewable as any other
question of law.' 24 Questions of severance under Rule 14, not involving the
validity of joinder under Rule 8, but relying instead on resulting prejudice as
a ground for severance, are resolved in the trial court's discretion, and as a
practical matter are unreviewable absent clear abuse.' 25 The burden of
proving that a trial court abused its discretion in failing to sever offenses
otherwise joinable under Rule 8 rests on the defendant, who must
make an affirmative demonstration that his rights to a fair trial have
been prejudiced by the joinder, and refusal to grant a severance will be
affirmed even if the circumstances are such that a grant of severance
26
would have been sustainable.'
Although the burden of persuasion imposed on an accused alleging prejudicial joinder is high, some appeals courts have reversed a trial court's
discretionary ruling denying severance.' 27 One commentator has con124. E.g., Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
830 (1969); 8 MOORE .14.02 [I] at 14-3. The federal "harmless error" doctrine (FED.

R. CRIM. P. 52(a)) has not generally been applied where the trial court erroneously
sustains joinder over the timely objection of a defendant. Dykes v. United States, 313
F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Ward v. United States, 289 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But

see Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970). See generally 8 MOORE 8.04 [2] at 8-14-15.
125. E.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954); United States v. Spinks,
470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Gray, 462 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009
(1972); United States v. Demetre, 461 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1972); Blunt v. United States,
404 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 909 (1969).
126. WRIGHT § 227 at 469.

127.

E.g., United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1973); United States

v. Reed, 376 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir.
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cluded, "If the appellate court is-left with a definite and firm conviction that
a defendant may have been prejudiced by the refusal to give him relief from
' 28
joinder, it must reverse the conviction."'
Whether the same standards of review would apply in Louisiana is
unclear. Unquestionably the determination of whether joinder is permis29
sible is essentially legal rather than factual. The federal courts so treat it, 1
and because the source provision of Article 493 is the federal rule, a
Louisiana court should regard a determination as to the propriety of joinder
under Article 493 as a question of law, reviewable on appeal as any other
question of law, and subject to reversal unless the error is harmless. The
inquiry under Article 495.1 as to whether joinder is in fact unduly prejudicial to the accused is a mixed question of law and fact, and the standard of
review should be whether the trial judge committed manifest error or abused
his discretion. 130
"Same Mode of Trial"
A final question regarding construction of the new Louisiana joinder
and severance provisions involves interpretation of the proviso which
concludes Article 493. Unlike its source provision, the amended version of
Article 493 requires that offenses to be joinable "must be triable by the same
mode of trial.' 131 Addition of this proviso undoubtedly stems from the
joinder considerations expressed in the Hataway'12 and Nejinl 33 cases, and
given state constitutional dimensions in State v. Jacques'34 and State v.
White.' 35 As noted earlier, in Hatawaythecourt held that the jurisprudential
1969); United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Bozza,
365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966); Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
128.

WRIGHT § 227 at 470.

129. See note 124, supra.
130. The federal courts review questions of severance under FED. R. CRIM. P. 14
in this manner. See note 125, supra. A question analogous to severance under Article
495.1 arises in reviewing denials of severance of jointly tried defendants under LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 704. In the latter case, the standard of review is whether the court
committed "manifest error" resulting in "clear prejudice to the accused." E.g.,
State v. Cook, 215 La. 163, 39 So. 2d 898 (1949); Bennett, The Work ofthe Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 10 LA. L.
REV. 198, 217 (1950).
131. See the textual discussion beginning at note 77, supra.
132. 153 La. 751, 96 So. 556 (1923) (discussed in note 21, supra).
133. 139 La. 912, 72 So. 452 (1916) (discussed in note 19, supra).
134. 171 La. 994, 132 So. 657 (1931) (discussed in the text beginning at note 30,
supra).
135. 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931) (discussed in the text beginning at note 34,
supra).
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rule sanctioning joinder of offenses within an accusation when the offenses
were cognate did not permit cumulation when one offense was triable by a
five-man jury and the other offense by a twelve-man jury. The court said, in
effect, joinder was permissible only when the offenses charged were subject
'
to the "same mode of trial." 136
Similarly, the court held in Nejin that
joinder of offenses within an accusation, and hence for trial, was improper
when the offenses were subject to varying methods of appeal. 137 Both
Jacquesand White involved joinder of offenses under the mandatory joinder
rule of Article 218 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, and together
they held that joinder of offenses was constitutionally 138 impermissible
when the offenses were not subject to the same type of trial and the same
method of appeal.
Article 1, § 17 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides that
criminal juries shall be comprised of either six or twelve jurors, depending
on the severity of the penalty which may be imposed upon conviction.
Obviously, a single jury cannot be comprised of six and twelve jurors at the
same time, thus cumulation of an offense triable by a twelve-man jury with
one triable by a six-man jury would violate the constitutional mandate of
Article 1, § 17. The offenses clearly are not triable by the "same mode of

trial.?

139

However, despite State v. Jacques,"4 it is difficult to understand why
136. State v. Hataway, 153 La. 751, 759, 96 So. 556, 559 (1923).
137. Article 493 by its terms does not proscribe joinder of offenses subject to
separate modes of appeal, and as a result does not appear adequately drafted to cover
the objection of the court in Nejin. Only if the accused is convicted of a felony, given
a fine in excess of $500, or sentenced to imprisonment for more than six months will
he be entitled to direct appeal to the supreme court. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D).
However, an accused will be entitled to a jury trial whenever the penalty may be
imprisonment for more than six months. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17. It is therefore
possible for two misdemeanor offenses to be subject to the "same mode of trial" and
yet give rise to different modes of appeal.
138. The decisions, of course, construed La. Const. art. 7, § 41(1921). Compare
LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
139. State v. Hataway, 153 La. 751, 96 So. 556 (1923).
140. 171 La. 994, 132 So. 657 (1931). The court in Jacquesdid not discuss why a
single twelve-man jury could not serve in dual capacities, reaching a verdict as to
non-capital charges with nine jurors concurring, and as to capital charges with
unanimity. The court assumed that the same jury could not serve in that manner, and
therefore that capital and non-capital major felonies constitutionally required separate trials. Their conclusion hardly seems compelled by the constitution, though
under La. Code Crim. P. art. 337 (1928), it may have been correct. That statutory
provision required that when capital and non-capital offenses were joined, the
verdict had to be unanimous as to all crimes charged.
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capital offenses cannot be cumulated with major but non-capital felonies 4 '
in an indictment and for trial. In both cases the constitutionally required
number of jurors is the same; the only difference is the number who must
concur in the verdict. Juries could be instructed by the trial judge that to

return a verdict on the capital charge, the decision must be unanimous,
while to convict or acquit on the non-capital offense ten jurors concurring
would be sufficient. Such a procedure should be deemed sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Article 1, § 17, since as to each charge the requirements

as to total number of jurors and number of jurors concurring in the verdict
are met.
CollateralProblems Relating to Joinder of Offenses
Double Jeopardy and Multiplicity

Amendment V of the United States Constitution,
the 1974 Louisiana Constitution,

143

42

Article 1, § 15 of

and Article 596 of the Louisiana Code

of Criminal Procedure' 44 guarantee that an accused may not be twice put in
jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense. 145 In 1932146 the United

States Supreme Court articulated the generally accepted, although occasionally criticized, 147 standard for determining whether a criminal transac141.

When such joinder would be prejudicial, the defendant could compel

severance under LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides inter alia: "[N]or shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..."(emphasis
added).
143. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 15 provides inter alia: "No person shall be twice placed
in jeopardy for the same offense, except on his application for a new trial, when a
mistrial is declared, or when a motion in arrest of judgment is sustained . . ."
(emphasis added); see generally Hargrave, The DeclarationofRights of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 51 (1974).
144. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 591.
145. The double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment has been held
applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
748 (1969). The guarantee provides protection against multiple punishment "for the
same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
146. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). "[W]here the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
The origins of this rule were identified in Comment, Double Jeopardyandthe Identity
of Offenses, 21 LA. L. REV. 615, 617 (1961), as the early English case of The King v.
Vandercomb and Abbott, 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796). See
generally 8 MOORE 8.07 [2] at 8-51.
147. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, in a dissenting
opinion to Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), criticized the "same evidence test,"
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tion gives rise to but one offense, or more: the "same evidence" test."'

The double jeopardy safeguard bars not only subsequent prosecution
for the same crime, but also imposition of multiple penalties for a single
offense, though the offense might have been properly charged in several
counts of an indictment. 49 The above situation must be distinguished from
that in which several separate and distinct offenses, provable by some
different element of evidence or involving some different aspect of criminal
culpability or criminality, arise out of the same criminal act or transaction or
a connected series of acts and transactions. 5 0 Consequently, the federal
courts do not permit assertions of double jeopardy (or "multiplicity") to
defeat joinder of several counts arising from the same criminal episode
within an indictment, since whether ultimately one offense or several will be
proved depends on what occurs at trial. 5
and called for its replacement with a "same transaction test." One commentator
notes "the ease with which the same evidence test can be manipulated to create a new
offense whenever the prosecutor is so inclined." 8 MOORE 8.07 [3] at 8-59. The test
is also criticized in Comment, Double Jeopardy and the Identity of Offenses, 21 LA. L.
REV.

615, 617-18 (1961).

148. Louisiana courts have historically followed the "same evidence test." E.g.,
State v. Foster, 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924) ("whether the evidence necessary to
support the second indictment would have been sufficient to have procured a legal
conviction on the first"). Id. at 897, 101 So. at 258. Recently however, the Louisiana
Supreme Court announced a slightly different test-the "gravamen test." State v.
Didier, 262 La. 364, 263 So. 2d 322 (1972) ("Where the gravamen of the second
offense is essentially included within the offense for which first tried, the second
prosecution is barred because of former jeopardy"). Id. at 378, 263 So. 2d at 327. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has continued to reject the "same transaction test" of
double jeopardy. City of Baton Rouge v. Jackson, 310 So. 2d 596 (La. 1975),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 TermCriminal Trial Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 605,634 (1976); State v. Richmond, 284 So.
2d 317 (La. 1973).
149. Some commentators refer to the defect of cumulative sentencing for a single
offense as "multiplicity," and attempt to distinguish it from true "double jeopardy,"
the latter more narrowly applying only to second prosecutions for the same offense. 8
MOORE 8.07 [1] at 8-44. Courts do not necessarily make this distinction, and at any
rate, it is clear that the tests used are identical-i.e., "same evidence." Id. 8.07 [2] at
8-51.
150. E.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386(1958) (a single narcotics sale held
to constitute three separate and distinct offenses for which cumulative sentencing
was proper). Louisiana courts have held that when multiple murders result from a
single criminal episode double jeopardy does not prevent trying them independently;
they are separate and distinct offenses though provable by much of the same
evidence. State v. Richmond, 284 So. 2d 317 (La. 1973) (applying the "gravamen
test" of State v. Didier, supra note 148); State v. Cannon, 185 La. 395, 169 So. 2d 446
(1953).
151. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 225 (1952).

COMMENTS
Louisiana always has allowed charging one offense in separate counts
of an indictment or information, with each count specifying alternative
ways the offense could have been committed. 52 The rationale for authorizing such pleading is to prevent the "miscarriage of justice" that would
result under a more restrictive pleading scheme "if the facts proved at trial
53
happened to deviate even slightly from those alleged in the indictment."
Louisiana courts, like federal courts, appear willing to sanction multiple
charges, though imposition of multiple penalties when only one offense is
proved is impermissible. Whether one offense, or more than one, is proved
154
is governed by the "gravamen" test of State v. Didier.
The double jeopardy clause and its concomitant multiplicity safeguard
have been narrowly construed by application of the "same evidence" test
(or in Louisiana, the "gravamen" test). But now that Louisiana has
liberalized its joinder rules, the question arises whether the importance of
the double jeopardy/multiplicity rules is increased. The answer is that they
are not. The same test will apply in determining whether jeopardy has
attached, and a single offense may still be punished by the imposition of
only one sentence. Louisiana's liberalized joinder rules merely allow the
prosecutor to cumulate charges of related but separate and distinct offenses,
subject to the accused's right to sever them when undue prejudice is shown.
Each separate and distinct offense is subject to but one penalty, whether the
offenses are triable separately or together; each offense may be tried but
once.
Effect of Louisiana's New Joinder Rules on the
Guidelines of State v. Prieur
In State v. Prieur 55 the Louisiana Supreme Court by a bare majority
However, if upon trial only one offense is proved, only one sentence can be imposed;
or, if the jury convicts on multiplicitous grounds, consecutive sentences would not be
proper. See discussion at 8 MOORE 8.07 [1] at 8-48-49.
152. See notes 12 (before 1928), 47 and 48 (between 1928 and 1966), 57 (since
1966), supra. The supreme court, however, has not permitted imposition of cumulative sentences when only one offense was proved. State v. Bluain, 315 So. 2d 749 (La.
1975); State v. Johnson, 278 So. 2d 84 (La. 1973); State v. Todd, 278 So. 2d 36 (La.
1973); State v. Hungerford, 278 So. 2d 33 (La. 1973); State v. Scott, 48 La. Ann. 293,
19 So. 141 (1896).

153. SLOVENKO at 70.
154. 262 La. 364, 163 So. 2d 322 (1972) (see note 148, supra, for an articulation of
the "gravamen test").
155. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973); See Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in
Louisiana-IL To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., in the Case in Chief, 33 LA.
L. REV. 614 (1973).
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fashioned a number of procedural safeguards 156 to the introduction of
"other crimes" evidence offered to prove knowledge, intent, or system in
accordance with La. R.S. 15:445-46. "7 The court noted that Louisiana's
statutory law provides for admission of "other crimes" evidence not
comprising part of the res gestae or used to impeach only to prove the
accused's knowledge, intent, or system. The court suggested that the
limited specification of uses of "other crimes" evidence "reflect a con-

scious desire on the part of the draftsmen [of the 1928 Code of Criminal
Procedure which first enumerated them] to adopt a limited, rather than
58
expansive approach to the admissibility of other acts of misconduct. 11
The court did not discuss the possible existence of other exceptions,
jurisprudentially grounded, to the general rule excluding "other crimes"
evidence because of its inherent tendency to prejudice the accused, though

at least one-identity-appears to have been well established in the jurisprudence before Prieur.5 9 The identity exception has also been recognized
by' the court after Prieur."0 Subsequent supreme court decisions indicate
that the majority remains committed to Prieur,'6' though in State v.
Banks162 the court held that "[t]he rules of Prieur were not meant to be used
as additional, technical procedures sacramental to a valid conviction.
156.

The requisites include written notice prior to trial of the prosecution's

intended use of the other crimes evidence, specification of the exception under which
it will be offered, and assurance that the evidence is necessary rather than merely
cumulative. Furthermore, the introduction of the other crimes evidence must be
accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions. 277 So. 2d at 130.
157. LA. R.S. 15:445-46 (1950) enumerate only knowledge, intent, and system as
the bases under which other crimes evidence may be offered for purposes other than
impeachment (LA. R.S. 15:495) or res gestae (LA. R.S. 15:447-48). However, the
cases suggest that other crimes evidence is admissible to prove identity, based on a
signature crime (e.g., State v. Vince, 305 So. 2d 916 (La. 1974)), or when identity is
otherwise put at issue (e.g., State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 549 (La. 1975)). The
jurisprudence has not answered whether the Prieur guidelines must be followed in
cases in which the "other crime" is offered to establish identity, but State v. Banks,
supra, suggests the answer is yes.
158. 277 So. 2d at 128.
159. E.g., State v. Wideman, 218 La. 860, 51 So. 2d 96 (1951); State v. Fuselier,
174 La. 319, 140 So. 490 (1932); State v. Wales, 168 La. 322, 122 So. 52 (1929).
160. E.g., State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975).
161. State v. Brown, 318 So. 2d 24 (La. 1975); State v. Pearson, 296 So. 2d 316
(La. 1974); State v. Ghoram, 290 So. 2d 316 (La. 1974).
162. 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975). Banks involved "other offenses" used to establish
the identity of the accused where he asserted an alibi defense and claimed mistaken
identity on the part of the prosecution's witnesses. The parties assumed that the
Prieur requisites were applicable in spite of the fact that neither knowledge, intent,
nor system was involved.
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Substantial compliance with this procedure designed to insure a fair trial
163
will not be penalized.'
The purpose of Prieurand progeny is to protect the accused from
"criminal propensity prejudice" which inheres in "other crimes" evidence
despite the fact that it is deemed legally relevant. The advance notice and
specification requirements of Prieurafford defense counsel an opportunity
to challenge intelligently the introduction of other crimes evidence, with the
concomitant effect of promoting sounder judicial rulings on admissibility. " The instruction requirements are designed to mitigate the prejudicial
aspects insofar as possible, while not depriving the jury of evidence relevant
to a material question at issue. Of course, in addition to use of "other
crimes" evidence to prove knowledge, intent, and system, evidence of
non-charged offenses is admissible under Louisiana law when those "other
65
crimes" comprise part of the res gestae of the offense charged.1
The new joinder rule embodied in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 493 authorizes joinder of separate offenses within a single
accusation when they arise from the same criminal act, or result from a
single illegal transaction, or result from two or more illegal acts or
transactions joined or connected by a common scheme or plan, or are of the
same or similar character. 166 Presumably, even absent joinder of offenses,
whenever a crime falling in either of the first two categories is prosecuted,
evidence of other crimes arising out of the same act or transaction would be
admissible as part of the res gestae. Thus, whether joinder is permitted or
not, the jury would learn of the "other offenses."1 67 When two or more
separate acts or transactions are related by a common scheme or plan,
evidence of offenses other than the one charged normally would be
admissible to prove knowledge, intent, system, or identity, 68 so that
163. Id. at 597.
164. Evidence of "other crimes" may be excluded as a matter of legal relevancy
since its prejudicial effect is likely to outweigh its probative value. State v. Foss, 310
So. 2d 573 (La. 1975).
165. LA. R.S. 15:447-48'(1950); see Comment, Excited Utterances and Present
Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV.
661 (1969).

166. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493. See art. 493 in the text at note 65, supra.
167. E.g., State v. Richmond, 284 So. 2d 317 (La. 1973) (Defendant, in a single
criminal episode, killed two persons. He was convicted in separate trials for each
murder; in each trial evidence of the other murder was admitted as part of the res
gestae. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the second conviction over defendant's double jeopardy objection, which had been based on his prior conviction.).
168. Prieur requisites would have to be met in Louisiana. But because both
offenses are charged in the same indictment the defendant certainly receives advance
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allowing joinder does not increase prejudice to the accused. 169 Under the
last criterion listed, however, the scope of permissible joinder may go
beyond the limits of admissibility of other crimes evidence, though some
offenses of the same or similar character would be admissible to prove
knowledge, intent, system or identity. 70 In those situations in which crimes
of the same or similar character would be inadmissible under "other
crimes" exceptions, the effect of their cumulation under Article 493 would
be to undercut the vitality of the rule announced in Prieur.The jury will be
aware of alleged misconduct on the part of the defendant which heretofore
would have been excluded. In effect, the narrow exceptions of knowledge,
intent, system, and identity have been repealed when the offenses joined can
be characterized as merely of the same or similar character.
The federal courts' experience using the provision from which Article
493 was taken has been less than satisfactory.' 7' As a possible solution, one
commentator has suggested that joinder under Rule 8 be restricted to
offenses reciprocally and independently admissible as "other crimes"
evidence.' 7 2 This proposal is not without initial appeal, since whether
joinder involves increased prejudice may often depend on whether the
non-charged crime could have been independently presented to the jury.
However, the language of Federal Rule 8, and of Article 493 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, is clear, and such a narrow
73
construction does violence to its express terms. 1
notice of the state's intended use of the offenses. The defendant may always object to
joinder on the grounds of prejudice under article 495. 1, and if he prevails will be given
a severance.
169. United States v. Adams, 434 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1970) (drug sale and drug
possession charges joined although the crimes occurred nine months apart; the court
upheld joinder on the theory that they comprised a common scheme or plan); Baker
v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970)
(court approved joinder of tax count and theft count on the theory that they were
"connected together" and formed part of a "common plan or scheme"). Thus, a
danger exists that Article 493 can be expansively read.
170. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
171. E.g., United States v. Leca, 499 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1974) (drug charges
cumulated with gun violation charges); United States v. Biurassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th
Cir. 1969) (court approved cumulation of counterfeiting and bail jumping charges);
Williams v. United States, 317 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (cumulation of one count of
rape and one count of rape and robbery was not an abuse of discretion despite the lack
of connexity, since the offenses were "similar"); Chambers v. United States, 301
F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (cumulation of three unrelated housebreaking charges "not
prejudicial").
172. 8 MOORE 8.05 [2] at 8-21.
173.

See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493 at note 65, supra.
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Absent statutory modification of the new joinder scheme, the provisions of Article 495.1174 offer the greatest likelihood of protection to an
accused. They provide that in the event an accused is deprived of a fair
determination of guilt or innocence as to each crime chargedby joinder of
offenses the court must grant a severance. 175 A broad construction of that
article, one in which the listed criteria for evaluation of prejudice-number
and complexity of the offenses cumulated and the likelihood that the jury
will be confused over the law or evidence-are not deemed exclusive, could
provide the vehicle whereby the accused is protected from undue prejudice.
However, the application of Article 495.1 is a matter of trial court
76
discretion, and that exercise of discretion is virtually non-reviewable. '
Abolition of the Article 493 criteria authorizing joinder of offenses of
the same or similar character, however, is not desirable, since it would work
against the valued considerations of judicial and prosecutorial efficiency. In
some situations joinder of the same type, or similar offenses, though
unrelated, might not prejudice an accused. No reason exists to bar joinder of
offenses when no prejudice accrues against an accused.
Perhaps the best way to deal with the question of undue prejudice, in
view of the possible disutility of Article 495.1 for this purpose, is to enact
the American Bar Association proposal giving the accused an absolute right
to severance when the offenses are joined because they are of the same or
similar character. 7' 7 In this way, the goals of efficiency could be maintained
insofar as possible without depriving the accused of protection in those
cases in which joinder has unduly prejudicial effects.
Consolidation of Separately Indicted Offenses for Trial
A question related to joinder of offenses in an accusation is when
separately indicted offenses may be consolidated for trial. Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure Article 706178 provides that separately indicted
offenses may be joined for trial only upon motion of the accused, and only
when the offenses could have been charged in the same indictment or
information. Because of the latter requirement, the liberalization of joinder
under Article 493 has the effect of liberalizing the applicability of the
consolidation article.
Because Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 706 is tied to
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1 in text at note 75, supra.
See text beginning at note 129, supra.
See text beginning at note 146, supra.
ABA STANDARDS at § 2.2(a).
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 706.
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the rules governing joinder of offenses, and because, as earlier noted,
misjoinder is a non-fatal defect which is deemed waived if not timely
asserted, 17 9 it is not surprising that the Louisiana Supreme Court has treated
improper consolidation as a waivable defect. Defendants have had little
success raising an objection to improper consolidation of offenses for the
first time on appeal, 180 the court being inclined to find either a waiver of the
objection or harmless error.
The 1975 amendments to the joinder rules have effected a change in
determining the initial and ultimate permissibility of joinder of offenses,
requiring not only that initial joinder comply with the criteria listed in Code
of Criminal Procedure Article 493, but also requiring that the court must
sever the offenses under Article 495. 1 when undue prejudice to the accused
is shown. Arguably, in determining for purposes of Article 706 whether
consolidation is proper, the functional criteria of Article 495.1 are applicable and should be utilized by the court in its exercise of discretion.' 8 '
Conclusions
The new joinder rules adopted by the Louisiana legislature represent an
attempt to strike a realistic balance between the need for judicial and
prosecutorial efficiency and the responsibility to afford to an accused a fair
trial. The provisions theoretically appear to have effected that balance.
However, ultimate responsibility for insuring that the rules are not used to
179. See text at note 64, supra.
180. In a non-jury trial where no contemporaneous objection was made to
consolidation, the court has declared that the error was "harmless." State v.
Robertson, 310 So. 2d 619 (La. 1975) (the offenses consolidated arose out of the same
transaction and would now be joinable under article 493 as amended); State v.
Laurent, 290 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974) (consolidated offenses arose out of a single
continuous transaction; the court observed that evidence of the consolidated offense
would have been admissible as part of the res gestae). Cf. State v. Peters, 298 So. 2d

276 (La. 1974) (Separate indictments for armed robbery and simple kidnapping were
consolidated for trial. Defendant appealed conviction on armed robbery after his

conviction on kidnapping was set aside because of an improper jury [defendant was
entitled to a five-man jury on the kidnapping chargel. The Louisiana Supreme Court
on rehearing denied relief on the basis that the defendant's failure to object before
trial operated as a waiver. Justice Tate concurred finding "harmless error".). When
the offenses consolidated involved unrelated criminal episodes, the supreme court
has in dicta suggested consolidation is improper. State v. Raby, 259 La. 909, 253 So.
2d 370 (1971).
181. By way of contrast, LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 493 and 495.1 do not afford the

trial court discretion. If the terms of article 493 are met, initial joinder is proper, and
the accusation cannot be severed unless under article 495.1 the court makes a finding
of undue prejudice, then severance becomes mandatory.
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233

prejudice the accused unduly falls upon the courts. They must resolve, on a
case by case basis, whether joinder is permissible under Article 493, and
whether it is unduly prejudicial under Article 495.1. If the supreme court
insists on a liberal application of Article 495.1, the joinder rules will
represent a desired change in Louisiana's system of criminal justice.
Ideally, a court which voluntarily imposes protective safeguards in the area
of other crimes evidence will take an equally protective view of an accused's
rights under the new Louisiana joinder scheme.
David S. Kelly

